This article explores systemic and market barriers preventing the wider use of BRICS national currencies in trade, including currency swaps mechanisms and reasons for BRICS exporters’ preference not to use national currencies. Design 􀂀aws are outlined in the New Development Banks’ Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA) in the context of de-dollarizing BRICS trade, namely its IMF linkage requirements and limited scope, symptomatic of a lack of trust between BRICS member states. The current levels of dedollarization in Russia’s intra-BRICS settlements (as a representative sample) are used to 􀁿nd gaps between Russia’s stated de-dollarization goals and current initiatives, and market barriers are identified
to explain this gap. Finally, the components of market mechanisms needed to de-risk Intra-BRICS trade and overcome the identi􀁿ed barriers are outlined.

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